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RIEGGER v. BREWING CO.
TORT SUIT BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND'S
EMPLOYER
Riegger v. The Bruton Brewing Company'
The report of this case did not set forth the exact facts
but, from the question raised, it can be assumed that the
plaintiff, a married woman, was injured by the negligence
of her husband in the course of his employment, and she
brought this suit against her husband's employer, the de-
fendant, upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. The
defendant demurred to the plaintiff's declarations and thus
the question was flatly presented: "Is a husband's em-
ployer liable to an employee's wife for injuries sustained
by her as the result of her husband's negligence while act-
ing within the scope of his employment?" The Court of
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the action of the lower court
in sustaining the defendant's demurrer without leave to
amend and thus answered the question in the negative.
In so declaring the law of Maryland the Court based its
decision upon four somewhat interrelated grounds, anyone
of which would be sufficient to justify the decision. First,
citing Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,2 which had held that
the Maryland statute3 controlling a married woman's rights
did not change the common law rule that a wife could not
maintain an action against her husband for a personal tort,
the Court reasoned, therefore, that since the husband is
not liable, although he is culpable, the employer cannot be
liable either, because liability and not culpability is the
true basis for the doctrine of respondeat superior. Sec-
ondly, citing the same case the Court concluded that since
such a cause of action as this did not exist at common law
in favor of the wife, the statute had not so enlarged her
rights so as to permit the action. In support of this second
ground the Maine case of Sacknoff v. Sacknoff was cited.
There, in construing a statute very similar to our own, it
was said:4
'178 Md. 518, 16 A. (2d) 99 (1940).
Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
S Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 5: "Married women shall have power
* . . to sue for . .. torts committed against them as fully as if they were
unmarried; . . . and they may also be sued separately . . . for wrongs
independent of contract committed by them before or during their mar-
riage, as fully as if they were unmarried; and upon judgments recovered
against them, execution may be issued as if they were unmarried; nor shall
any husband be liable . . . for any tort committed separately by her out
of his presence, without his participation or sanction."
I Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 A. 669, 670 (1932).
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"This statute being in derogation of the common
law has been construed strictly. The provision au-
thorizing a married woman to prosecute suits at law
in her own name, as if unmarried, refers to those by a
wife against third persons and not to those against
her husband . . . 'It related to cases when, by the
very assumption, the husband may be a party with
the wife, or may not at her election' . . . and, it only
authorizes her to maintain alone such actions as pre-
viously could be sustained when brought by the hus-
band alone or by the husband and wife jointly. It en-
larges not her right of action, but, her sole right of
action. It does not enable her to maintain suits which
could not have been maintained before, but to bring in
her own name those which before must have been
brought in the husband's name either alone or as a
plaintiff with her ... "
The inference is clear. The husband in this case, the
actual wrongdoer, is not in a position to join himself as a
co-plaintiff with the wife against his employer, and there-
fore, by strict construction of the statute the wife has no
corresponding right of action in her own name.
Thirdly, the Court said that such an action "would in-
troduce into the home, the basic unit of organized society,
discord, suspicion, and distrust, and would be inconsistent
with the common welfare."5 The reason behind this third
ground was that if the wife could sue and recover against
the employer, then the employer could recover against the
husband-employee who was the actual wrongdoer. The
result would be the same on the family as if the wife had
sued her husband directly, which is strictly forbidden.6
Here, the Court acted and quoted from Raines v. Mercer
where the Tennessee Court said that since the wife "could
not maintain her action against her husband, alleged to be
directly responsible for her injury, she could not avoid the
forbidden frontal attack by the encircling movement
against ... (the employer) who had no part in the negli-
gent transaction."'  Fourthly, and in conclusion, the Court
said that to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the
views heretofore expressed by the Court in cases: (a)
denying the right of a wife to maintain a suit similar in
Riegger v. The Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 522, 16 A. (2d) 99
(1940).
6 Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, supra, n. 2.
Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S. W. (2d) 263 (1932).
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character to the one under consideration against her hus-
band directly;' (b) holding that she has no right of action
for similar injuries against the partnership of which her
husband is a member;9 and (c) holding that a parent can-
not enforce such an action against his child.'0 Therefore,
said the Court: "The reasoning of those decisions would
seem logically to commit us to the further step of holding
that under the circumstances considered, a right of action
in favor of the wife against the employer does not exist.""
The weight of authority in this country is in accord with
Maryland in not permitting the wife to sue the husband
for a personal tort under the emancipation statute,'2 but
Maryland is decidedly in the minority on the question of
a wife suing the husband's employer for the husband's
negligence in the scope of his employment. 18 Conceding,
therefore, that a wife cannot recover from her husband di-
rectly for a personal tort, would it necessarily follow that
she could not recover from his employer? The majority
of the cases allow this suit even though the wife could not
sue the husband-servant who was the actual wrongdoer.
The first ground for Maryland's decision was that since
the husband himself was not liable, the master was not
liable, thus assuming that liability of the servant was a con-
dition precedent to any liability upon the part of the
8 Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 8upra, n. 2.
9David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932), noted (1936) 1 Md. L.
Rev. 65.
10 Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).11 Riegger v. The Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 525, 16 A. (2d) 99,
102 (1940).
1237 A. L. R. 165; 56 A. L. R. 331; 64 A. L. R. 296. For cases holding
the minority view: (1935) 21 Corn. L. Q. 157, 165; 29 A. L. R. 482; 33
A. L. R. 1406; 44 A. L. R. 794; 89 A. L. R. 118.
13 In accord with Maryland: Maine v. James Maine and Sons Co., 198
Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 20, 37 A. L. R. 161 (1924) ; Meece v. Holland Furnace
Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1934) ; Emerson v. Western Seed Co., 116 Neb. 180,
216 N. W. 297 (1927); Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 A. 669
(1932) ; Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. (2d) 385, 79 P. (2d)
419 (1938); Riser v. Riser, et ux., 240 Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 290 (1927).
Contra Maryland: Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23, 101
A. L. R. 1223 (1935); McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., 166 Miss. 180,
146 So. 877 (1933); Cerrute v. Simone, 13 N. J. Misc. 466, 179 A. 257
(1935); Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E.
42, 64 A. L. R. 293 (1929); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff, 48 Ohio
App. 412, 194 N. E. 429 (1935) ; Paulin v. Graham, 102 Vt. 307, 147 A. 698
(1939) ; Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 407, 181 A. 792 (1935) ; Miller v. J. A.
Tyrholm and Co., 196 Minn. 438, 265 N. W. 324 (1936); Rosenblum v.
Rosenblum, 231 Mo. App. 276, 96 S. W. (2d) 1082 (1936) ; Pittsley v. David,
298 Mass. 552, 11 N. E. (2d) 461 (1937); My Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel,
235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938) ; Miltimore v. Milford Motor Co., 89 N. H.
272, 197 A. 330 (1937); Broaddus v. Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S. W.
(2d) 1052 (1940); Le Sage v. Le Sage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N. W. 369 (1937).
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master. According to the weight of the cases, this assump-
tion is not justified. The master's liability is not second-
ary, but primary. It is held that he who acts through an
agent acts himself, and both principal and agent are pri-
marily liable."4 It is the agent's negligence which makes
the principal liable, but, because the agent is not liable
due to the wife's disability to sue her husband, such fact
does not make the agent's act any less negligent, and the
principal cannot hide behind the agent's immunity. The
Ohio Court puts the argument nicely:'"
"The right to sue the employer is not a dependent,
but a primary right; the liability of the employer is not
based upon the employee's liability and is not subordi-
nate, or secondary thereto. The liability of the em-
ployee is for his wrongful conduct and the liability of
the employer is for his breach of duty through his
employee acting for him. The breach of duty as to
each is so independent of the other that in a case such
as the one at bar, the injured party, even if she were a
stranger to the employer, could not maintain a joint
action against the negligent employee and his em-
ployer."
This Court, as do most of the cases answering the ques-
tion under consideration in the affirmative, cited the Re-
statement of Agency, Section 217 (2) to the effect that
a master "may be liable for an act as to which the agent
has a personal immunity from suit;" with its comment
(b): "Thus if a servant while acting within the scope of
his employment negligently injures his wife, the master
is subject to liability."
Probably the most often quoted case is the Shubert
case.16 In New York when this case was decided, the com-
mon law rule was that neither spouse could sue the other
for injury either wilfully or negligently inflicted, but the
case allowed the wife to sue the husband's employer in an
almost identical fact set up as in the case under considera-
tion. The Court held, of course, that the principal is not
1"McLaurin v. McLaurin Furniture Co., supra; Schubert v. Schubert
Wagon Co., supra; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff, supra; Paulin v.
Graham, supra; Koontz v. Messer, supra; Miller v. J. A. Tyrholm and Co.,
supra; Mullally v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S. W. (2d)
645 (1936) ; My Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, supra; Hudson v. Gas Con-
sumers Ass'n, 123 N. J. L. 252, 8 A. (2d) 337 (1940) ; Cerrute v. Simone,
supra; Broaddus v. Wilkinson, supra.
'" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Huff, 8upra, n. 13.
'l Shubert v. Shubert Wagon Co., supra, n. 13.
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liable if the agent's act was lawful, and an accord and satis-
faction or release to the agent would have the same effect
as if the agent's act had been lawful. But, the principal
is not exonerated when the agent has the benefit of a cove-
nant not to sue or a discharge in bankruptcy, or has escaped
liability upon grounds not inconsistent with the commis-
sion of a wrong unreleased and unrequited. The principal
has committed the act by the agent's hand and the prin-
cipal has a liability all his own. Trespass against the
wife is unlawful and others cannot hide behind the skirts
of the agent's immunity. Clearly then, it would seem that
the cases and the Restatement do not support Maryland on
this ground.
The Maryland Court, as its second ground, reasoned in
effect that Article 45, Section 5 of the Code, only gave the
wife the right to sue in her own name in cases where for-
merly suit could have been brought by the husband alone,
or by the husband and wife jointly against the third per-
son at common law before the statute, and it thus inferred
that since the husband is the actual wrongdoer he would
not have been in a position at common law to sue the prin-
cipal himself, either alone or jointly with the wife.
This argument would apply to a suit by the wife against
the husband directly, where at common law the husband
would appear on both sides of the record as plaintiff and
defendant. This is not allowed.17 In the case under con-
sideration the wife was suing a third person, the employer,
who is liable independently of any liability of the agent,
according to the weight of the cases. If Maryland's first
ground is sound law, perhaps this second ground would
follow; but, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the
better line of reasoning seems to be that the wife, when
injured under these circumstances, derives two causes of
action: the first against her husband for his negligent
act, the second against the employer for committing the
act by the agent's hand. Both are primary rights of action
and are separate and distinct. If this line of reasoning is
sound, and it is generally considered to be the better of the
two views, the reason behind the Maryland decision on
this ground vanishes.
As a third basis for it's decision the Maryland Court
argued that to allow the wife to sue the employer would
foster discord, suspicion, and distrust in the home, the
basic unit of organized society. This seems to be the true
17 Thompson v. Young, 90 Md. 72, 44 A. 1037 (1899).
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motive and only possible justification for the decision.
Briefly, the Court said that if the wife recovers from the
employer, then the employer can recover from the em-
ployee and the effect of such an "encircling movement"
would be to allow the wife to sue her husband indirectly
when admittedly she could not do so directly. The Court
said:18 "It cannot logically be contended that to permit
the action would not result in a disturbance of the family
relationship, creating discord and suspicion, which ele-
ments are the basis for the common law rule of non-lia-
bility." This vein of public policy runs through most of
Maryland's decisions on suits between members of the
family, such as those cases denying the wife the right to
maintain action against the husband for personal tort,
denying the right of the parent to sue the child, denying
the wife the right to sue a partnership in which her hus.
band is a member. In the Schneider case it was said:"
"We need not dwell upon the importance of main-
taining the family relation free for other reasons from
the antagonisms which such suits imply. Both natural
and politic law, morality and the precepts of revealed
religion alike demand the preservation of this relation
in its full strength and purity."
A further example of this policy of the Court of Appeals to
refrain from involvement in domestic quarrels appears in di-
vorce suits, such as Cohen v. Cohen," where the Court said,
in effect, that it only interferes where continuance of mar-
riage is inconsistent with health, self respect, and reason-
able comfort of the other spouse.
However, under Article 45, Sections 5 and 20 of the
Code,2 it has been decided that a wife may sue the hus-
band at law or equity in contract, and likewise for the pro-
tection of her property.2  In the Cochrane case a wife was
allowed suit in equity against her husband for an account-
ing to the wife by the husband who wrongfully appro-
priated her property and misapplied the proceeds thereof.
18 Riegger v. The Bruton Brewing Co., supra, n. 1.
9 Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 23, 152 A. 498, 500 (1930).
20 Cohen v. Cohen, 170 Md. 630, 187 A. 104 (1936).
2 Md. Code (1939) Art. 45, Sec. 20: "A. married woman may contract
with her husband and may form a copartnership with her husband or with
any other person or persons in the same manner as if she were a femme
sole, and upon all such contracts, partnership, or otherwise a married
woman may sue and be sued as fully as If she were a femme sole."
" Cochrane v. Cochrane, 139 Md. 530, 115 A. 811 (1921) ; Masterman v.
Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 98 A. 537 (1916).
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In that case the Court used language quite broad enough
to infer that recovery by the wife against the husband
would be allowed for a tort by the husband against the
wife's property and yet there was no mention of public
policy.
Thus it appears that Maryland allows a wife to sue
her husband, in law or equity, on contracts and for torts
against her property, but forbids recovery for a tort against
her person by the husband. It seems unlikely that such
suits as are allowed foster less family strife and discord
than those which are forbidden.
However, admitting that suits by the wife directly
against the husband are against the pronounced public
policy of Maryland, must a suit by the wife against the
husband's employer be placed in the same class? Those
cases which allow recovery by the wife against the em-
ployer recognize the public policy rule forbidding suits by
a wife against the husband, but hold that the policy that
gives the husband immunity from actions at law by the
wife does not extend the immunity to his master. The
Massachusetts Court has said:"
"It is true that, if the wife recovers from the master,
the husband would be bound to indemnify his master,
and her recovery could not profit the family unless
her husband should be financially irresponsible. Such
reasons are unsound."
The master can recover back from the husband-servant,
not by subrogation of the wife's cause of action, but di-
rectly against the husband for breach of his duty to his
master. Any subsequent recovery against the employee
by the employer would have to be satisfied out of em-
ployee's property without recourse to the wife's separate
property, since her estate is immune from attack at the
hands of the husband's creditors. Further, there could be
cases in which injury to the plaintiff would not necessarily
involve a breach of duty owed to the employer. For in-
stance, the employee could be instructed that deliveries
must be finished by a certain time and yet the route to be
covered might be so large that, in order to do so, the em-
ployee would be obliged to drive at a reckless rate of speed.
In such case a party injured might recover from the em-
ployer but the employee would not be liable to the em-
ployer because there would be no breach of duty. Other
23 Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 11 N. E. (2d) 461, 463 (1937).
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instances of this type could happen. In such cases, the
argument that the wife was suing the husband indirectly
would not apply, yet in Maryland the employer would not
be liable merely because the injured party happened to
be such employee's wife.
Fourthly, the Maryland Court said that to hold other-
wise, that is to allow recovery by the wife, would be in-
consistent with former decisions. The reasoning to this
point would indicate that the result should not have been
controlled by the decisions denying a wife the right to
maintain personal injury suits against her husband, or by
the decisions denying such suits between parent and child.
The only authority closely persuasive was David v. David.4
In that case, in refusing to allow the wife to sue the part-
nership to which her husband belonged, the Court declined
to view the firm as an entity, but regarded it as an aggre-
gate of individuals, including the husband, each member
being severally liable for torts of the firm, and thus the
husband was bound to contribute to the co-partners his
proportionate share of any sum advanced by them to
satisfy the wife's claim against it. It is questionable
whether that decision was sound, particularly when the
real reason behind Maryland's decision was the public
policy which would not allow the spectacle of a suit be-
tween husband and wife for a personal tort because it
would result in a disturbance of the family relationship.25
If it is questionable whether a suit against the partnership
would create such a disturbance, it is even more question-
able where the suit by the wife is against the husband's
employer. At any rate, it is not reasonable for the Court
to take further steps in the wrong direction merely for the
sake of consistency, especially where no course of conduct
or property rights are based on such former decision.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the con-
clusion of the Court was avoidable; and it was not neces-
sary because of any of the four reasons .stated by the
Court as the basis of the decision to refuse a remedy for
the injury. On the contrary the Court easily could have
distinguished the case from its former decisions, allowed
the wife to recover in accord with the weight of authority,
and prevented the resulting injustice. It would not have
been impossible even, or improper, for the Court to have
4
upra, n. 9.
See Note, Tort Suit by Wife Against Husband's Partnership (1936) 1
Md. L. Rev. 65, noting David v. David, supra, n. 9.
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retreated from its earlier holding in the partnership case,2
which was the only one of great persuasive influence on
the point involved. It is regrettable that a doctrine, stem-
ming from the rapidly disappearing (if not obsolete) fic-
tion of identity of husband and wife, should have led the
Court to affirm the unwise social result of the instant case,
particularly when it is contrary to the weight of authority
and the law expressed in the Restatement of Agency.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Baltimore Transit Company v. Faulkner'
Two cases, both entitled Baltimore Transit Company v.
Faulkner, one having been instituted by Faulkner and the
other by his son, were tried together. The plaintiffs, who
were driving in the father's car, had a collision with one
Michlick at a busy intersection in Baltimore City. Mich-
lick having admitted that he was at fault, Faulkner, never-
theless, insisted upon taking pictures of the automobiles.
Consequently, a traffic jam resulted and several employees
of the Baltimore Transit Company, whose duty it is to
keep the tracks clear, attempted to remove the cars. To
this, Faulkner objected; but the defendant's employees per-
sisted in disengaging the cars. Faulkner started a fight in
which his son joined. The father and son thereafter sued
the Baltimore Transit Company for an assault and battery
allegedly caused by defendant's employees. The lower
court found that defendant's employees were guilty of an
assault and battery even though Faulkner had been the
initiator of the affray.2
Having agreed with the trial court on this phase of the
case, the Court of Appeals focused its attention on a con-
sideration of the problem of awarding exemplary damages.
The lower court had instructed the jury in each case that
if they found that the assault and battery committed by
defendant's employees was "wanton and excessive" they
could award not only actual damages but also such further
punitive damages as they might think proper from the
26 David v. David, supra, n. 9.
1 20 A. (2d) 485 (1941).
2 Defendant had sought to justify the assault on the ground that its
employees had acted in self-defense, but as the plea did not allege that no
more force than the exigency reasonably demanded was used, it was de-
fective.
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